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THE EVER-CHANGING SCOPE OF INSIDER 
TRADING LIABILITY FOR TIPPEES IN THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT
Sari Rosenfeld*
ABSTRACT
Liability under insider trading law continues to change as federal courts 
attempt to find new ways to hold insiders liable under the law.  As recently as 
two years ago, the Second Circuit—in analyzing past decisions regarding 
tipper-tippee insider trading violations—blurred the distinction between legal 
and illegal insider trading1 when it fundamentally altered the idea of 
“personal benefit.”  These various decisions provide the basis for antifraud 
provisions of securities law applying to insider trading,2 the consequences of 
which can be detrimental.3This Note will discuss the standard that the Second 
Circuit uses to hold tippees liable for insider trading violations under the 
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.  It will begin by exploring a line of cases that lead 
up to Second Circuit’s decision to alter the personal benefit test, which shifted 
more responsibility than ever onto the tipper’s state of mind.  This Note will 
analyze that test and discuss the implications and problems that come with it.  
These include a greater likelihood that tippees will engage in deceptive 
behavior to extract material, non-public information from tippers.  They also 
increase the potential that more parties caught in the middle of these situations 
will receive hefty prison sentences.  Following that analysis, this Note will 
suggest an alternative approach—qualifying the personal benefit test to make 
it depend on more objective factors than it currently does.  It will then discuss 
the court’s decision to amend and supersede its initial holding and replace it 
with a test which did not have a substantive impact on the outcome.  It will 
ultimately conclude that the same test should apply.
* J.D., December 2018, University of Michigan Law School.
1. Matthew L. McGinnis et al., Martoma Tips the Balance on Insider Trading Liability, 23
WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 1,1 (2017). 
2. See David Miller et al., The Martoma Decision: The Second Circuit Tackles Insider 
Trading Post Salman, MORGAN LEWIS (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/the-
martoma-decision-the-second-circuit-tackles-insider-trading-post-salman (last visited Apr. 19, 
2019).
3. See 15 U.S.C. §78ff (2002) (explaining the penalties for insider trading can be as serious 
as $5 million or 20 years imprisonment). 
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I. INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY FOR TIPPERS AND TIPPEES
Insider trading occurs when an insider accesses material, non-public infor-
mation, then uses that information to buy or sell a security, where the infor-
mation provides a certain profit.4 If the scheme involves two people, the person 
who receives the information is referred to as the “tippee,” and the person from 
whom the tippee receives the information, the “tipper.”  Over time, case law has 
interpreted the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act to restrict 
market players from distributing this information and from using it5—
specifically applying this to the tipper and tippee relationship.  It has done this 
because both using and distributing the information allows people to have an 
unfair advantage in trading.  This conduct violates Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange 
Act, which is the general catch-all antifraud provision, promulgated by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC).6 Rule 10b-5, which does not explic-
itly refer to insider trading, provides that:
4. See Akhilesh Grant, Insider Trading, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 29, 2019),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insidertrading.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
5. See Miller et al., supra note 2.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security.7
Rule 10b-5 is more widely used by private plaintiffs than any other anti-
fraud provision of federal securities law.8 Interestingly enough, the rule itself 
does not provide an explicit cause of action for these private plaintiffs.  But in 
1946, a federal district court recognized an implied cause of action.9 Ever 
since, private plaintiffs can sue for insider trading violations, along with other 
fraudulent behavior, including tippee liability.
Insider trading violations under Rule 10b-5 provide judges the ability to 
sentence offenders to harsh consequences.  According to the SEC, the maxi-
mum penalty a defendant can receive for violating insider trading law is 20 
years in prison, the maximum individual fine is $5,000,000, and the maximum 
fine for non-natural persons, such as an entity whose securities are traded in the 
public markets is $25,000,00010—all situations that are worth avoiding.
A. Duty to Disclose or Abstain from Trading
In 1961, the SEC decided that to avoid insider trading liability, a tipper 
must abstain from trading in the shares of his own corporation, unless he first 
discloses all material information that he knows to the market.11 Just seven 
years later, the Second Circuit took this rule and applied it to people beyond di-
rectors and corporations—broadening the scope of those who could be held lia-
ble for insider trading violations.12 In that case, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co, the 
Court states the following:
“[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the 
investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corpo-
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).
8. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 
199 (4th ed. 2015). 
9. Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
10. 2013 Insider Trading Policy, SEC (2013), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/25743/000138713113000737/ex14_02.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
11. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
12. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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rate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recom-
mending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undis-
closed.”13
B. Classical and Misappropriation Theories
Insider trading law evolved into two theories: the Classical Theory and the 
Misappropriation Theory.  Under the Classical Theory, an individual violates 
insider trading law by trading securities (without disclosure) based on material, 
non-public information.14 That insider can be held liable by trading in the 
shares of his own company for a profit.  The Classical Theory also applies to a 
temporary insider, who can be held liable by trading for profit on information 
gained while he was in a fiduciary relationship with the issuer. Misappropria-
tion Theory applies when the insider misappropriates confidential information 
for trading purposes, in a breach of duty to the source of information.15 This is 
what differentiates it from the Classical Theory, where the insider has instead 
deceived shareholders.16
Although these theories do have fundamental differences, the elements of 
tipping liability are ultimately the same under both.17  And many courts have 
recognized that the idea of personal benefit,18 a critical factor in determining a 
tippee’s liability for insider trading, can apply under both theories.19
C. Receiving Information
In 1983, the Supreme Court held that tippees could also be found liable for 
insider trading violations under the Classical Theory when the tippee receives 
material nonpublic information and trades on it.20  But the Court limited this 
liability: under Dirks, the tippee could only be held liable in situations where 
the tipper breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the in-
formation to the tippee.21 And in this situation, the tippee either must know, or 
should have known, that there was a breach.22 Dirks therefore found that the 
tippee’s duty is derivative.
13. Id. 
14. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997).
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 196 L. Ed. 2d 351(2016).
18. The personal benefit test is discussed infra pg. 6.
19. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 92 n.2 (2d. Cir. 2017). 
20. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 647 (1983). 
21. Id. at 663.
22. Id. at 660.
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D. The Personal Benefit Test
Whether there is a derivative breach will depend on whether the tipper ben-
efited either directly or indirectly from this disclosure—something that came to 
be known as the personal benefit test.23 According to the Court, either a pecu-
niary gain or a reputational benefit counts as a direct or indirect personal benefit 
if it translates into future earnings.24 Alternatively, the tipper can benefit from 
gifting information to a relative or a friend.25 Absent this personal gain, there is 
no breach to the shareholders,26 and by extension, there is no derivative 
breach.27
To put a complicated rule into context, the following occurred in Dirks:
Dirks specialized in providing investment analyses for insurance companies.28
While employed, he received insider information from a former officer of an 
insurance company that, because of fraudulent corporate practices, the insur-
ance company was overstating its assets.29 Dirks did not trade in the insurance 
company’s stock.  After he received the information, he decided to investigate 
the matter.30 Throughout his investigation of the company, Dirks discussed the 
information he learned with clients and investors, and some of these acted on 
this information.31 The Court found that the tipper who gave Dirks the infor-
mation had no monetary or personal benefit from giving him the information,32
and therefore did not breach a duty to their shareholders.33 Rather, the Court 
attributed the insider’s motivation as exposing fraud.34 Because Dirks had no 
derivative breach, he had no duty to abstain and was therefore not guilty of vio-
lating Rule 10b-5 for insider trading.35
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND SUPREME COURT ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE 
PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST.
The Dirks decision left courts confused about the personal benefit test.36
Dirks itself provided neither a definition nor concrete guidance on what person-
23. Id. at 663.
24. Id. 663–64.
25. Id. at 664 (discussing the concept of gifting information to a relative or friend). The 
Court further explored this idea in Salman, which is discussed infra.
26. Id.
27. Id. 
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 649. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 664.
33. Id. at 665.
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 667.
36. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. 
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al benefit really means, but satisfaction of the personal benefits test was neces-
sary to find the tippee liable.37 All it did was give several examples of what a 
personal benefit might be as general guidelines for applying the test.38
In 2014 the Second Circuit in light of the Dirks decision, provided its own 
conclusion on what it means to personally benefit in the Newman case.39 The 
court held that personal benefit requires a “meaningfully close personal rela-
tionship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and repre-
sents at least a potential gain of pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”40 The 
court in Newman emphasized the idea that although the gain need not be imme-
diately pecuniary, it must “be of some consequence.”41 Its analysis suggests 
that somehow, the tipper must gain something, either as money or through a re-
lationship with another that will lead to opportunities to profit.  According to 
the court, this potential comes from this close relationship between the tipper 
and tippee.42
A. The Supreme Court Expands the Personal Benefit Test.
Three years ago, however, the Supreme Court expanded its test for insider 
trader liability when it held that the tipper’s benefit received need not be pecu-
niary at all.43 The tipper can instead “personally benefit” without receiving a 
monetary interest.  Salman v. United States involved an insider who shared in-
formation from his job as an investment banker with his brother,44 who began to 
trade on the information.45 Although he was not initially aware of his brother’s 
activities, the insider later actively assisted the brother in his trades.46 Without 
the insider’s knowledge, the brother shared this insider information with others, 
including the insider’s brother-in-law, Salman, who traded on the information 
and received a huge windfall.47
37. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663. 
38. Id. at 663–64 (“[T]his requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the in-
sider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a 
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.”). 
39. 773 F.3d at 452; Matt Levine, Everything is Insider Trading Again, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 
24, 12:14 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-24/martoma-ruling-shows-that-
everything-is-insider-trading-again (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
40. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
41. Id. at 453.
42. Id. at 452. 
43. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 422. 
44. Id. at 424.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (“By the time the authorities caught on, Salman had made over $1.5 million in profits 
that he split with another relative who executed trades via a brokerage account on Salman’s be-
half.”). 
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The Supreme Court decided that when a tipper discloses inside information 
to a tippee, the Court will treat the situation as if the tipper gave the tippee a 
cash gift.48 This rule applies to tipping family members and friends.49 Gifting 
information to a family member or friend is therefore insider trading because
the tipper still benefits from this gift.50 As the majority opinion explained, “the 
tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading information is the 
same thing as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds.”51 There 
is therefore no need for a true, monetary interest because, according to the 
court, the tipper already got its equivalent.
The Court did not define how close a relationship must be between the tip-
per and the tippee for its new rule to apply.52 From acquaintances to friends to 
close friends, anyone could in theory be a tipper under the Court’s vague lan-
guage.
B. Under the Second Circuit, Tipping is Now a Personal Benefit.
The Second Circuit tried to answer the question of how close a tipper must 
be to a tippee for insider trading liability to apply when a three-judge panel 
heard Mathew Martoma’s appeal in August 2017.53 In this case, United States 
v. Martoma, the Second Circuit originally said that a meaningfully close rela-
tionship is not necessary and explicitly overruled Newman.54 But in June 2018, 
the Second Circuit revisited its own decision and superseded it—once again 
adding to the confusion.55 However, before discussing how the Second Circuit 
has continued to convolute the personal benefit test—not once, but twice—it is 
important to understand the facts of the case and how they come into play.
The defendant, Mathew Martoma, managed a portfolio for a hedge fund run 
by prominent investor Steven Cohen.56 Martoma invested in two pharmaceuti-
cal companies that were developing drugs for Alzheimer’s;57 he advised Cohen 
to do the same for the hedge fund’s main portfolio.58 Soon thereafter, Martoma 
consulted with a knowledgeable doctor who was working on the clinical trial 
48. Id. at 428.
49. Id.
50. Id.; Levine, supra note 39.
51. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428.  
52. See id. 
53. See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2017), amended and superseded 
by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Alexandra Stevenson, Mathew Martoma’s Insider Trading 
Conviction Is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/23/business/dealbook/mathew-martoma-insider-trading-conviction-upheld.html (last visit-
ed Apr. 19, 2019).
54. 869 F.3d at 70.
55. See United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
56. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 61. 
57. Id.
58. Id. 
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for the Alzheimer’s drug.59 This doctor, Dr. Gilman, charged him $1,000 per 
hour, and Martoma consulted him on forty-three different occasions.60 Gilman, 
as a member of the safety monitoring committee, “had an obligation to keep the 
results of the clinical trial confidential.”61 He broke that confidence when he 
provided Martoma with extensive information about the clinical trial.62 Marto-
ma did not just consult with Dr. Gilman though.  He also engaged Dr. Joel Ross, 
another doctor working on the trial.63 That doctor charged him even more mon-
ey than Dr. Gilman did.64 Dr. Ross was similarly obligated to keep the infor-
mation confidential.65
In July 2008, Martoma and Gilman met to discuss data on the drug.66 After 
their meeting, Martoma no longer believed that the stocks were profitable.67 He 
quickly contacted Mr. Cohen and convinced him to sell his position in these 
companies.68 Between Martoma and Cohen, the hedge fund avoided $194 mil-
lion in losses by selling stocks before trial results were revealed to the public;69
in fact, by short-selling the shares, the fund made an $80.3 million profit.70
Martoma received a $9 million bonus for his trading activity.71  His “predic-
tions” were correct.
Martoma was convicted for insider trading violations and subsequently ap-
pealed.  On his appeal, he challenged that, under the language in Newman, he 
and Dr. Gilman did not have what constituted a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship.”72 Martoma also argued that Dr. Gilman did not receive any gain 
that was pecuniary or similarly valuable in nature because of Mr. Martoma’s 
trading.73
The Court uniquely responded to this appeal—it interpreted the Salman
court’s interpretation of Newman, and ultimately overruled Newman.  This is 
important because it reflects the first time that a federal circuit court has inter-
preted Salman.74 The Second Circuit came to the following conclusion: the 
59. Id.
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id.
63. Id. at 62.
64. See id. at 61–62.
65. Id. at 62.
66. Id. 
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Emily Flitter & Basil Katz, U.S. Charges Ex–SAC Manager in a $276 Mil-
lion Insider Scheme, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-
insidertrading-sac-idUSBRE8AJ0Y020121120 (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
70. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 62. 
71. Id. at 63.
72. Id. at 64.
73. Id. at 64–65. 
74. McGinnis et al. , supra note 1, at 1. 
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Salman Court already overruled the Newman court’s requirement of a close per-
sonal relationship.75  This was no longer good law.76  Chief Judge Katzmann 
explained that it is possible to benefit from a tipper-tippee relationship, outside 
of a meaningfully close relationship.77
The Second Circuit came up with two requirements: (1) for a tippee to be li-
able, the tipper must have disclosed the information to the tippee with the ex-
pectation that the tippee would trade on the information,78 and (2) the disclosure 
must also result in a “gift of the profits to the recipient.”79 And, as stated above, 
this expectation did not take into account the strength of the tipper-tippee rela-
tionship.
C. The Problematic Nature of the Original Martoma Test
The original personal benefit test that Martoma set out before it superseded 
its own decision was problematic because of the expectation prong.  Absent the 
requirement of a meaningfully close relationship, the bar to meet the personal 
benefit requirement for tippee liability was—at that point—much lower.  This 
would make it much easier to prosecute individuals, but that was not the prob-
lem with the test.  Whether it is appropriate to lower the bar for tippee liability 
is of course, subject to debate.  What was problematic with that test, though, 
was attempting to understand how the court was trying to define expectation.
The standard itself was unclear.  This is because that test—had it sur-
vived—would have led to consequences for some tippees, while other tippees 
who deceive tippers into feeding them information might walk away from a sit-
uation with zero liability for insider trading violations, without a meaningful 
distinction between the tippees.  It is important to note that the court explained 
the following with regards to the first prong: the holding reaches only the insid-
er who discloses inside information to someone he expects will trade on the in-
formation.80 In other words, if the tipper were to accidentally leak information 
to the tippee but never thought that the tippee would actively trade on this in-
formation, then there would be no personal benefit under Martoma, and the tip-
pee could not have been liable for insider trading.
The main problem with the expectation standard set out in this case is that it 
was a vague concept, and the court neglected to define better what it means.  
What is even more confusing, is that under this test, there could have been end-
less possibilities regarding expectation, and the court did not elaborate on any of 
75. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 69 (“We respectfully conclude that Salman fundamentally altered 
the analysis underlying Newman’s ‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ requirement such that 
the ‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ requirement is no longer good law.”). 
76. Id. at 58. 
77. Id. at 71. 
78. Id. at 70. 
79. Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664).
80. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 71.
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them.  It instead alluded to the fact that personal benefit is a factual inquiry, 
leaving room for the lower courts to interpret what it means.81 The subjectivity 
of the test as a whole was dangerous.
The expectation standard might have instead led to the unequal treatment of 
tippees, even when they behave in the same way, because their liability ulti-
mately depends on the tippee’s beliefs.  For example, there may be a hypothet-
ical situation, involving Tipper A, who is an employee of the same technology 
company as Tipper B.  Tipper A accidentally leaks information to Close Friend.  
And Tipper A did not, in any way, and under any (potential) test, expect that 
Close Friend will trade on the information.  Close Friend then trades and profits 
on that information.  Meanwhile, Tipper B discloses confidential information to 
Another Close Friend—perhaps carelessly—and has a small inkling that Anoth-
er Close Friend might trade on the information.  Another Close Friend, like 
Close Friend, trades on the information and receives a windfall.
According to the initial Martoma decision, Another Close Friend would 
have been liable for insider trading violation while Close Friend is not.  Why 
should two people, who behaved identically and used their knowledge to trade 
in the markets, end up in entirely different situations?  In both cases, the tippee 
gained an unfair advantage over the market, and used that advantage to profit 
over the unaware market.
An initial read of the Second Circuit decision—before the court superseded 
its own decision—led me to formulate several alternative tests that could better 
define the expectation standard.  The first approach I considered was a modified 
subjective expectation test.  It is true that the original test was already subjective 
in the sense that expectation could be measured in a multitude of ways.  To 
overcome this hurdle, this test would have to lay out particular examples that 
would consider the tipper’s knowledge about the tippee’s overall sophistication 
as a purchaser and knowledge of the market.  In theory, it sounds like a good 
test. But it would be too complicated.
For example, in a hypothetical world, we have Tipper A, who works for a 
technology company that went public.  For some reason, Tipper A believes that 
the company is about to enter a period of financial hardship––although there is 
no concrete evidence of this in the securities market.  Tipper A then tells all of 
this to Close Friend while the two have a cup of coffee.  Perhaps the law should 
require Tipper A to only expect that Close Friend will then trade on the infor-
mation if Tipper A knows that Close Friend is familiar enough with the securi-
ties market to understand that this might be a good opportunity to sell shares.
But requiring Tipper A to know how much that Close Friend knows about 
the securities market would be problematic.  This is because both policing such 
a situation and finding good evidence would be challenging.  A rule like this 
would make more sense than the previous scenario if the goal of insider trading 
law is to prohibit sophisticated tippees from abusing the system.  The issue is 
that knowing something about the tippee suggests that the two have a previous-
81. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
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ly existing relationship, perhaps even a close relationship.  And according to the 
original Martoma decision, that factor is legally irrelevant.
But there is an even larger issue behind all of this—the tippee could easily 
deceive the tipper into thinking the tippee does not know anything about the 
market.  For example, the tippee might put on a confused face, sit back, listen, 
pretend he or she does not understand what is going on, and then use the infor-
mation to his or her advantage.  In that case, the tippee would get away with the 
conduct because the tipper did not hold the expectation.  And this would defeat 
the purpose of the original rule altogether.  After all, subsection (c) of Rule 10b-
5 says that it is unlawful to “engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”82 A rule 
like that would do exactly the opposite—inducing more deceitful behavior by 
tippees to avoid 10b-5 liability.
Courts could, therefore, take a different approach and create an objective 
expectation test.  That test would instead ask what the tipper would reasonably 
expect to occur in a situation like this.  But that test would also be problematic 
because it would be implying ordinary negligence—and because insider trading 
is a crime, this would be an unusual standard to use.  The test would, therefore, 
need to specifically require criminal negligence to determine what a reasonable 
expectation would be.
Perhaps the best idea would be to hold the act of tipping the information it-
self to be enough.  The tipper, by giving out information, should expect that an-
yone he gives the information to will trade on that information.  This would 
solve the problems of dealing with different levels of sophistication.  This test 
would also solve the fairness problem—all tippees would be equally liable.  A 
test like this, however, would be far too extreme because it would require tip-
pers to constantly monitor their behavior to the point where they do not speak at 
all.  It would also essentially create a strict liability situation, which means that 
there would be no room for error when it comes to leaking out information, 
even if done by accident.
For example, we might have a situation where Tipper A is completely dis-
traught about the situation and calls Close Friend to vent his frustrations.  Is it 
fair to require Tipper A to assume that Close Friend will trade on the infor-
mation?  This would certainly deter Tipper A from tipping the information in 
general, but that would require Tipper A to be overly cautious in any kind of 
these situations, and that might burden the market’s overall efficiency.83 Alt-
hough this Note does not argue that insider trading is valuable, it is important to 
note that arguments for allowing insider trading can help us understand why 
communication, in general, cannot be cut off altogether.  Some people believe 
that insider trading allows more information—other than what is publicly dis-
82. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5.
83. See Andrew Sebastian, Why Insider Trading is Bad for Financial Markets, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Sep. 28, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets-economy/092216/
why-insider-trading-bad-financial-markets.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
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closed—to be reflected in a security’s price.84 As a result, this makes the price 
more accurate.85 A better test for insider trading should take into account the 
need for active communication regarding the security.  The communication 
should just be executed in a manner that is fair for all market participants. The 
test should, therefore, encourage informed traders to participate in the market—
allowing people to talk to some extent.
Of the three options presented, option 2 is the best test for determining how 
to hold tippees liable under insider trading law. Given my own interpretation of 
the court’s goals, along with the fact that liability only reaches the tippee fol-
lowing the tipper’s expectation, focusing on how to narrow the expectation 
standard so that insider trading law targets the right people seemed like the best 
solution.  And that solution would be reached through objective criteria.  The 
best way to do this would be to place a reasonableness qualifier on expectation.  
The results would be better: it would shift the focus from the tipper’s belief on 
this individual tippee to what the tipper would reasonably expect the tippee to 
do with the information, based on society’s general expectation and standards.  
And it would be harder for tippees to get away with deceptive behavior. This is 
because the tipper could have suspected that the insider would trade before the 
tippee ever traded.  Such an improved test would set guidelines for the kind of 
care that tippers should take in determining who to speak to, if anyone at all, 
when it comes to material, non-public information, and provide the tipper with 
advance notice of the kind of behavior that would lead to liability.
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT FURTHER CONFUSES THE 
PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST’S LANGUAGE
A. From Expectation to Intention
Not long after providing its confusing interpretation of insider trading, the 
Second Circuit edited its opinion in Martoma and superseded it.  It appears, 
however, that the amended test presents exactly the same issues that made 
Martoma confusing in the first place.
B. The Amended Decision
Martoma II, as amended, removed the expectation test as the primary means 
for interpreting personal benefit.86 Instead, the court explained that there is no 
need to decide if Newman’s gloss on gift theory is inconsistent with Salman be-
cause there are many ways to find a personal benefit.87
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See generally Martoma, 869 F.3d at 58, amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
87. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 71.
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Subsequently, the court explains its decision by reapplying the logic in 
Dirks.88 The court interpreted Dirks as allowing for many ways to gain a per-
sonal benefit.89 And this interpretation, according to the majority, is rooted in 
intention.90 According to the majority, the key area of disagreement between its 
holding and the dissent is whether intention requires a relationship as its foun-
dation.91 The majority believes that the relationship is necessary, while the dis-
sent does not.92
The reason the court chooses to analyze this is because the language in 
Dirks can be read to suggest both that a relationship is a specific requirement 
and a lack thereof.93 The court in Martoma II decided to read that sentence in a 
way that separated intention from a close personal relationship.94 And the rea-
son that the Second Circuit did this was to show that as long as the tipper wants 
the tippee to trade on the information, it should not matter whether they had 
some sort of pre-existing relationship.95 What is important, instead, is the out-
come.96
C. Distinguishing Expectation from Intent to Benefit
While Martoma II does not rely upon expectation in its opinion,97 its slight 
change in language does not seem to make any difference.  Martoma II narrows 
the Martoma I decision in finding it unnecessary to determine if Newman’s the-
88. Id. at 74.
89. See id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Dirks v. S.E.C. 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (using the following language to explain per-
sonal benefit: “For example, there may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient that 
suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.”). 
94. See Martoma, 894 F.3d at 74.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 75 (“For example, suppose a tipper discloses inside information to a perfect 
stranger and says, in effect, you can make a lot of money by trading on this. Under the dissent’s 
approach, this plain evidence that the tipper intended to benefit the tippee would be insufficient to 
show a breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty to the firm due to the lack of a personal relation-
ship. Dirks and Warde do not demand such a result. Rather, the statement ‘you can make a lot of 
money by trading on this,’ following the disclosure of material non-public information, suggests an 
intention to benefit the tippee in breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty.”); See also id (“The tipper’s 
intention to benefit the tippee proves a breach of fiduciary duty because it demonstrates that the tip-
per improperly used inside information for personal ends and thus lacked a legitimate corporate 
purpose. That is precisely what, under Dirks, the personal benefit element is designed to 
test. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. Is evidence that an insider intended to benefit an outsider with val-
uable confidential information any less probative of the absence of a legitimate corporate purpose 
than evidence that the tippee gave the tipper trivialities like shellfish and a gift card? See United
States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013)).
97. See generally id. 
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ory was inconsistent with the Salman decision.98 Yet, the two versions of the 
decisions put us back in the same place, and with the same problem.
Both decisions still acknowledge the idea that a court can find a personal 
benefit without a meaningfully close relationship.  Some sources have interpret-
ed the amended decision as opening the door to more prosecutions of tippees for 
insider trading.99 And if the goal of the courts is to hold these tippees liable, 
then this interpretation makes sense.  Courts are placing an emphasis on the tip-
per’s awareness of how the tippee might benefit from the tip because it could 
deter tippers from improperly tipping.  At the same time, the amended decision 
in no way erases the same problem discussed earlier in this Note—that is, if you 
are to view the original expectation test and intent test the same way I do.
In fact, I do not see any difference between the concepts of expectation and 
intent.  Both are prefaced on the tipper’s prediction of how the tippee will use 
the information.  It would only make sense that if a tipper “intends” for some-
one to benefit from a tip, there must be an expectation that the person will use 
the information and trade on it.  Otherwise the tippee just sits on the information 
and nothing changes from the status quo.
D. As a Result, the New Test Does Not Rid Itself of its 
Problematic Nature
Additionally, the test’s lack of specificity still makes it too subjective.  Due 
to a lack of a reasonableness qualifier, the new test can still allow a tippee to get 
away with using deceptive behavior to encourage the tipper to give away infor-
mation.  The majority opinion in Martoma II even seems to acknowledge this 
flaw to some extent because it tries to rebut the test’s inherent subjectivity.100
Despite its attempt, the test remains subjective.
98. Harry Sandick & Jared Buszin, INSIGHT: The Amended Opinion in Martoma Cuts Back 
on the Initial Decision, But Still Affirms, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jul. 9, 2018). 
99. See id. 
100. Martoma, 894 F.3d. at 76 (“Finally, we are warned that this approach creates a ‘subjec-
tive’ test and allows for convictions based on sheer speculation into the tipper’s mo-
tives. See Dissent, op. at 83–84, 88. These fears are unwarranted. Intent elements are everywhere in 
our law and are generally proved with circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Heras, 609 
F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (‘The law has long recognized that criminal intent may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence alone.’); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) (‘[A]s a 
general rule most evidence of intent is circumstantial.’). Insider trading is no different. A factfinder 
may infer the tipper intended to benefit the tippee from the sort of objective evidence that is com-
monly offered in insider trading cases. To return to the example above, the statement ‘you can make 
a lot of money by trading on this’ is strong circumstantial evidence of the tipper’s intention to bene-
fit the tippee. And the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains a formidable barrier 
to convictions resting on speculation. See United States v. Torres, 604 F.3d 58, 66 (2d Cir. 2010). 
We are thus satisfied that the personal benefit element can be met by evidence that the tipper’s dis-
closure of inside information was intended to benefit the tippee. And as is clear from the purpose of 
the personal benefit element, the ‘broad definition of personal benefit set forth in Dirks,’ and the 
variety of benefits we have upheld, the evidentiary ‘bar is not a high one.’ Obus, 693 F.3d at 292.”). 
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Just like with the old test, the addition of a reasonableness qualifier could 
solve a lot of problems and ultimately hold responsible parties liable.  As a re-
sult, the test would then read that the tipper might “reasonably intend that the 
tippee will benefit from the tip.”  Measuring the tipper’s behavior against the 
reasonable person would make it harder for tippers to get away with behavior 
that results in massive windfalls for the tippee, simply because the tipper did not 
“intend” the benefit.  This would place the tipper on notice to disclose infor-
mation legally and to be cautious about speaking—to the extent necessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s expansion of the personal benefit test is a clear at-
tempt to make it easier for courts to prosecute tippees for insider trading viola-
tions.  This move signifies the court’s distaste for insider trading, and goal to 
prevent those with an insider advantage from strategically obtaining millions of 
dollars in windfalls.  The Second Circuit, however, has failed to acknowledge 
that tippees may abuse the test through deception.  Replacing the current test 
with an objective intent test would help protect against that kind of behavior.
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